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Scientific research groups’ cooperation with 
firms and government agencies: Motivations and 
barriers 
 
Abstract. The behavior of academic researchers who engage in cooperation with 
industrial partners has already been the subject of considerable research. A lack of 
understanding exists regarding the motivations of scientific research groups to engage in 
cooperation with other types of external non-academic organizations and the perceived 
barriers that may inhibit this activity. In this paper we analyse the motivations and 
perceptions of risks that shape scientific research groups’ cooperation with industry and 
government partners. We find that motivations to cooperate are partly dependent on the 
type of partner organization involved, with advancing research goals mainly acting as 
an inducement to cooperate with government agencies, while searching for 
opportunities to apply knowledge motivates partnerships with firms. We also find that 
the majority of research groups cooperate with both firms and government, with their 
major motivation being to apply their knowledge. Among research groups that only 
cooperate with firms, interaction effects between motivations influence the likelihood of 
cooperation. Research groups do not consider risk to scientific autonomy a barrier to 
cooperating with firms, while risk to scientific credibility inhibits cooperation 
independently of the type of external partner. However, being motivated to advance 
research can reduce the effect of perceived barriers, independent of the type of partner 
organisation.  
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Public sector research organizations (PSROs), including universities and 
research institutes, are driven to cooperate with external private and public sector 
partners by a variety of factors. These factors include external demands for new 
knowledge (Meyer-Krahmer and Schmoch 1998; Schartinger 2002) as well as the need 
for financing (OECD 1999; Santoro and Gopalakrishnan 2000), and can generate 
interdependent relationships (Geisler 1995). Despite the volume of work done on 
cooperation patterns among scientific researchers (see the benchmark study of Katz and 
Martin (1997) and the recent review by Bozeman et al. (2013)), new aspects of 
cooperation need to be examined and there is considerable work remaining. This paper 
seeks to contribute to the cooperation literature by analysing whether scientists are 
driven by distinct sets of motivations, or perceive different barriers, depending on 
whether the external cooperation partner is a private firm or a government agency 
(public).  
The understanding of factors that may contribute to boosting links between 
researchers and external partners and, precisely, what binds different agents together 
remains limited (D'Este and Patel 2007; Lam 2011; D’Este and Perkmann 2011). This is 
despite the recognition that these factors are keys to a better understanding of the 
dynamic of knowledge transfer practices and relations (Bozeman et al. 2013). In this 
respect, the types and patterns of interactions between research organizations and their 
cooperative partners do not appear to assume a single typical overall form or set of 
arrangements (Thune 2007). Improved information is desirable in order to better assess 
the effects produced by current policies designed to facilitate cooperation between 
PSROs and the end-users of research (Turpin and Fernández-Esquinas 2011; Woolgar 
2007). However, the majority of the literature focuses on the analyses of cooperation in 
terms of university-industry relationships (Powell et al. 1996; Landry et al. 2007; 
D’Este and Perkmann 2011; Tartari and Breschi 2012; Dornbusch and Neuhäusler 
2015), overlooking a wider variety of external agents that can be involved in the process 
of cooperation. In this respect, the value added of this work is the understanding of the 
underlying factors that contribute to increase/decrease cooperative relationships and the 
differences that appear when this cooperation is conducted with different types of 
external partner organizations in both the private and public sectors. 
A second limitation of the current literature relates to how motivations and 
barriers affect each other. Most analyses assume that specific types of motivations have 
an independent effect on external cooperation activity. There has been no analysis to 
date of whether motivations are intertwined and how they might influence each other. 
Whilst researchers may be motivated by intellectual curiosity and by the desire to solve 
social problems, for example, there have been no analyses of whether being strongly 
motivated intellectually may also influence social motivations or vice versa. This is 
something of an oversight, given that researchers embrace multiple modes of external 
cooperation (Bozeman et al. 2013; Chompalov et al. 2002). In other words, many 
researchers’ are engaged in a range of cooperative activities, which are likely to be 
underpinned by the co-existence of multiple motivations. A contribution of this paper 
will be to analyse the interactions of different motivating factors to discover whether 
such interactions may also impact on the propensity to cooperate with different types of 
external partner organization. With notable exceptions, the current literature also tends 
to treat motivations and barriers separately. Yet, it seems highly likely that being 
strongly motivated to cooperate may reduce the perceived importance of certain barriers 
 4 
 
(Tartari and Breschi 2012). To complement this study, the paper thus also analyses the 
interactions between motivations cooperate and perceived barriers to see whether strong 
motivations can play a role in reducing the effect of barriers to cooperate with different 
external partners.  
Three research questions are addressed in this study. First, we investigate what 
motivates PSRO researchers to cooperate with external partners and identify the co-
existing perceptions of barriers that may be preventing or restricting cooperative 
relationships. Second, we assess the impact of researchers’ motivations and perceptions 
of barriers into the propensity to cooperate with different type of partner organization. 
Third, we ask whether interactions between different motivations, and between 
motivations and barriers, can impact on the propensity to cooperate with different types 
of partner organizations. The following section reviews literature about cooperation 
activities and the motives for and barriers to involvement in these relationships. Section 
3 specifies the methodological approach, the main variables and the analyses conducted, 
with results described in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 includes a discussion of the 
findings and proposes some policy implications of the study. 
 
2 Cooperation or non-cooperation: that is the question. 
2.1 Cooperation: why, how and with whom? 
According to a traditional model most often associated with Polanyi (1962) and 
Merton (1973), diverging logics can characterize cooperation relationships between 
researchers and external partners. On the one hand, public sector scientists’ decisions 
reflect and are shaped by a reputation-based scientific reward system (Merton 1973). On 
the other hand, private firms are guided by the imperative of producing tradable results 
(Dasgupta and David 1994), whilst ensuring that overall benefits exceed the costs of 
cooperation (Bolli and Woerter 2013) and that revenue increases while R&D costs - at 
worst - increase by a smaller proportion (Leyden and Link 2013). In this model, a 
fundamental tension exists between maintaining an individually-directed scientific 
career trajectory and participating in cooperatively-directed external research 
partnerships, even though these partnerships may potentially contribute to both the 
social relevance and resource base of a PSRO.  
In contrast to a traditional model, Owen-Smith and Powell (2001: 4) argue that 
contemporary researchers are required to respond to a broader set of institutional 
expectations, including entrepreneurial engagement, which has ‘created a myriad of 
positions that are neither old nor new school, but instead combine characteristics of 
both’. In this view, academics are increasingly required to conduct and manage an ever-
growing ‘portfolio’ of research activities. The broadening of university missions 
(Sánchez-Barrioluengo, 2014) and the ‘increased susceptibility of academic activity to 
both market forces and social expectations’ (Organ and Cunningham 2011), may push 
researchers towards cooperative activities with other organizations (Tartariet al. 2012). 
In another alternative model, Boschma (2005) describes a multi-dimensional concept of 
‘proximities’ (cognitive, organizational, social, institutional, geographical) as shaping 
the propensities for innovation system actors to cooperate and learn from each other. 
From this perspective too much proximity (path dependence and lock-in) is equally as 
problematic for innovation as too little proximity (isolation). From the perspective of 
this paper, of particular interest is the openness of PSRO research groups to cooperate 
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with multiple types of external partner organisations. Working with different types of 
non-academic partners could be important for avoiding the kinds of systemic ‘over-
coordination’ problems Boschma (2005) describes, which may be less likely to occur 
when cooperation and learning takes place with partner organisations of different types. 
The behaviour of academic researchers who engage in cooperation with 
industrial partners has already been the subject of considerable research (Bozeman et 
al. 2013; Perkmann et al. 2013). In fact, most studies of cooperation focus on 
university-industry relations, particularly academic entrepreneurship initiatives and 
commercialization efforts (Perkmann et al. 2013). What Bozeman and colleagues 
(2013) categorise as studies of ‘property focused’ research collaborations, either focus 
on increments to knowledge measured by articles produced, cited and, more rarely, 
demonstrably used, or focus on increments to wealth measured by patents, new 
technology, new business, start-ups and, more rarely, profits. This literature also 
highlights that collaborations with industry are shaped by the characteristics of scientific 
disciplines and some differences emerge between them in terms of both frequency of 
cooperation and mechanisms though which the relationship is established. Powell et al. 
(1996) and D’Este and Perkmann (2011) demonstrate the importance of cooperation 
with the private sector in life sciences and the physical and engineering sciences 
respectively, while Tartari and Breschi (2012) conclude that basic disciplines being less 
likely to cooperate with industry compared to applied disciplines such as engineering. 
Differences have also been observed in terms of knowledge transfer within natural 
sciences and engineering, with certain disciplines more active than others (Landry et al. 
2007). Tartari and colleagues (2012) investigate peer effects on university academics 
behaviour in engaging with industry in the UK, using social psychology to underpin the 
hypothesis that peers tend to emulate each other in this regard. They find that lower-
ranked scientists are influenced by the behaviour of their peers in the immediate social 
environment. Whilst they find that ‘basic disciplines’ (mathematics, chemistry and 
physics) are negatively correlated to working with industry, overall it is apparent that 
organizational units with a peer culture of cooperating with industry are likely to 
influence positively the cooperation behaviour of new or junior researchers.  
Another main difference appears in terms of the mechanism used in the process 
of knowledge transfer. In this case, disciplinary affiliation has also been found to affect 
the specific knowledge transfer channel researchers select for their interchanges with 
industry (Bekkers and Bodas Freitas 2008; Martinelli et al. 2008; Perkmann et al. 2013). 
Other studies conclude that there is strong variation in patenting rates between scientific 
discipline (Agrawal and Henderson 2002). Science, technology, engineering and 
mathematics (STEM) fields and social science and humanities (SSH) have also been 
found to engage in different types of knowledge transfer practices with industry partners 
(Olmos Peñuela et al. 2013). These authors also argue that differences between STEM 
and SSH are also related to the types of non-academic actors with whom researchers 
collaborate. While STEM researchers tend to engage with firms, SSH researchers’ 
cooperation partners are more diverse, including the public and voluntary sectors as 
well as through direct engagement with the public. 
The common limitation of these studies is that they focus on the private sector as 
the main agent with which researchers engage in cooperation activities. This paper 
expands the scope of studies of cooperation by including interactions with both public 
and private sector partner organizations.  
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2.2 Motivations and barriers for cooperation with external partners 
The existence of a motivation to cooperate externally may be stifled by 
perceived conflicts with the pursuit of individual scientific goals. A major limit to 
cooperation with external partners may thus lie in tensions between different 
motivations for conducting research. According, the driving forces behind researchers’ 
motivations to cooperate can be expected to be multiple, mingled, heterogeneous and 
conflicting (Bozeman et al. 2013). This section describes evidence about whether 
scientists are driven by distinct sets of motivations, or confront different barriers, 
regarding cooperating with external agents. 
Industrial cooperation can provide an opportunity to address dual challenges: 
accessing resources to continue future research activities and finding solutions to real 
problems. Some studies show that industry tends to partner with universities closer to 
basis or ‘new’ science phase (Hall, Link and Scott 2003). Others show that inventions 
stemming from academic and industry collaboration can influence future technological 
paths, including the innovativeness of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) 
(Dornbusch and Neuhäusler 2015), or that collaboration on both basic research and 
applied technological problems can allow firms to capture positive externalities 
generated by PSROs and universities (Belderbos et al. 2015). However, industrial 
cooperation relationships may encounter real difficulties due to the ‘cultural differences’ 
that have been shown to exist between academic and industrial environments (Siegel et 
al. 2003; Cunningham and Harney 2006), and profound cultural differences that can 
generate conflict, ‘since ‘values’ are addressed as socially shared cognitive 
representations of institutional goals and demands’ (Rokeach, 1979: 50; cited in 
Dolfsma and Verburg 2008: 1040).  
Lam (2011) uses scientists’ value orientation regarding the interrelation of 
science and society to analyse their attitudes toward working with industry partners. 
Being motivated by extrinsic rewards is associated with an academic value orientation 
that is relatively strongly differentiated from business concerns. Being motivated by 
intrinsic rewards such as problem-solving is associated with a relatively lower 
differentiation of science from societal concerns. What Lam (2011) terms ‘puzzle’ is the 
intrinsic reward of discovery and curiosity driven research, whilst ‘ribbon’ refers to a 
relatively Mertonian form of extrinsic reward focused on solving research questions. 
These contrast with entrepreneurial scientists for whom combinations of curiosity and 
‘gold’ (economic compensation) are important. In fact, Lam finds that half the scientists 
are ‘hybrids’ (2011: 1355) who ‘maintain a firm commitment to the core scientific 
values’, but also see the benefit of commercial engagement for their professional goals. 
These hybrid researchers are intrinsically motivated to cooperate externally in terms of 
satisfying their curiosity and making a contribution to society. It seems clear that 
alongside the extrinsic rewards of the ribbon, scientists can also be strongly intrinsically 
motivated in their commercial endeavours. Whilst this study deals with STEM 
disciplines only, it points out the multiplicity of both the goals and the motivations that 
individual scientists embrace (Owen-Smith and Powell 2001), highlighting the different 
configurations of these goals and motivations that appear to be associated with different 
cooperation activities.  
Perkmann and colleagues (2013) found that whilst attracting resources, 
obtaining knowledge, or building social capital are the main general logics 
underpinning cooperation, involvement in commercialisation activities is more 
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connected to interest in the exploitation of a specific technology and to obtaining an 
economic reward. D’Este and Perkmann (2011) found that academics are motivated to 
cooperate with industry primarily by the opportunities such cooperation affords to 
support their academic research work. Motivations are also dependent on the channel of 
engagement with industry, with patenting motivated by commercialization and other 
cooperative activities motivated by opportunities for new learning processes in addition 
to acquiring funding (Meyer-Krahmer and Schmoch 1998; D’Este and Perkmann 2011). 
Motivations for external cooperation are thus likely to depend on a range of individual 
and contextual factors. 
At the same time, the literature also highlights researchers’ concerns that the 
processes of cooperating with private industry can be detrimental to academic research 
(Slaughter and Rhoades 1996; Nelson 2001; Geuna and Nesta 2006). These concerns 
revolve mainly around the problems of secrecy and skewing (Florida and Cohen 1999). 
The secrecy problem refers to the extent to which an increasing degree of cooperation 
with industry is associated with restrictions on the disclosure and dissemination of 
research findings contrary to the norms of open science. The skewing problem refers to 
the possibility that a greater emphasis on cooperation with industry could skew 
scientists’ activities away from a curiosity-driven academic research agenda. Empirical 
studies have confirmed that a major concern of academic researchers is the potential for 
external co-operations with private industry to have a negative impact on their freedom 
to pursue a relatively autonomous research agenda (D’Este and Perkmann 2011; Lee 
1996). This concern is mirrored from an industry perspective, with intellectual property 
rights (IPR) problems regarding university collaboration being an apparently 
insurmountable barrier in some cases (Hall, Link and Scott 2001). These concerns can 
be ameliorated in the case of large research joint ventures (RJV) where the addition of a 
university is less likely to create additional appropriation problems compared to a small 
RJV (Link and Scott 2005), while entrepreneurial start-ups may find collaborating with 
universities less risky with regard to IPR than incumbent market occupants (Leyden and 
Link (2013). 
Tartari and colleagues describe the traditional concerns of academics regarding 
autonomy and freedom of information circulation as ‘orientation barriers’ to 
cooperating with industry (2012: 657-8). In addition, they identify ‘transactional 
barriers’ associated with the burdens of bureaucratic knowledge transfer and 
commercialization processes (2012: 658-9). The impact of these factors is mediated by 
researchers’ prior experience of industry cooperation and the amount of trust they have 
in these partners. Tartari and Breschi (2012) identify the potential to acquire resources 
as a key motivator cooperating which can overcome Mertonian-type barriers regarding 
risks to academic freedom and the openness of results. This study highlights the fact 
that strong motivations may have the effect of reducing barriers to industrial 
cooperation. 
In summary, previous literature has focused on the analysis of the factors 
underpinning motivations and barriers related to cooperation with firms. The 
shortcomings of this literature are twofold. First, whilst there is a growing body of 
evidence regarding motivations to cooperate with industry, this is not the case regarding 
motivations to cooperate with other types of external partners. There is also a 
concomitant lack of understanding about barriers to cooperating with external partners 
other than industry. Second, very limited work has considered motivations and barriers 
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as not existing in isolation, but as a spectrum of positive and negative factors 
influencing researchers’ propensity to cooperate externally. This paper contributes to 
filling these gaps, by asking the following questions. What are the underlying factors 
which motivate or hinder researchers’ cooperation with different types of external 
partners? What is the effect of researchers’ having multiple motivations to cooperate? 
To what extent does the presence of motivations decrease the effect of barriers? 
 
3 Methodological approach  
3.1 Research groups as unit of analysis 
Research groups1 are key knowledge producing organizations within national 
science systems (Rey Rocha et al., 2008) and a relevant unit of reference when R&D 
performance is evaluated (Larédo and Mustar 2001). Research groups are the 
fundamental collective unit of much scientific activity and their characteristics may 
have an important bearing on the motivations and barriers to cooperation with external 
partners, including both structural and functional factors (Martin-Sempere et al. 2002; 
Adams et al. 2005; S. Lee and Bozeman 2005). However, little is understood about how 
groups’ motivations and barriers may impact on a research groups’ propensity to 
cooperate with external partners. Due to the difficulty of questioning all members of a 
research group, in this study research group leaders’ opinions were taken as a proxy for 
the research group in terms of perceived motivations and barriers. Research group 
leaders were considered to be the best choice, not only because they may act as 
influential role models among co-workers (Bercovitz and Feldman 2008), but also 
because they are well-informed about individual research careers and strategies and 
about the portfolio of external cooperation activities in which the research group is 
involved. 
Research groups in PSROs in Spain are primarily located in universities and the 
centres of the Spanish National Research Council (CSIC), along with some Institutes 
directly funded by national and regional governments. The higher education sector 
includes 73 universities, of which 48 are public and 25 private. CSIC is the largest 
single research institution in the country, employing more than five thousand 
researchers. Table 1 summarizes their contribution − in terms of expenditure and human 
capital − within the Spanish R&D system: between them, universities and the CSIC 
account for almost 34% of R&D expenditure and approximately 54% of full time 
equivalent (FTE) researchers in Spain. In this study we use the research group as a 
transversal unit of analysis common to all PSROs. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
3.2. Survey and sample 
The core of the study is a survey among the heads of the research groups as 
representers of the general experiences of the research team. The survey was structured 
                                                            
1 In our study we consider a research group that which works as a stable team, usually consisting of one 
leader and several researchers at different stages in their professional careers. Team members share goals, 
resources and research activities. 
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in five sets of questions: interviewee profile; research group characteristics; 
relationships between the research group and other agents in the innovation system; 
detail on cooperation with firms; and evaluationg of the regional context for cross-sector 
cooperation with non-academic organizations. The survey was self-completed online 
with telephone reinforcement. This paper focuses on the second and third parts of the 
survey to develop its analysis.  
The population consisted of active research groups in PSROs in Spain, following 
official sources in four regions with different scientific and technological profiles – 
Andalusia, the Basque Country, the Canary Islands and Madrid (Ramos-Vielba 2011). 
Through a quota sampling method from a census survey, we obtained a final sample of 
851 research groups weighted according to the total number of research groups in each 
of the four regions. The survey was targeted at research group leaders, focusing on these 
scientists’ perceptions about external cooperation and was conducted in October-
December 2011. It achieved a representative response by region with a total sample 
error of ±3.2%2.  
3.3. Main variables 
The survey included two questions about motivations for (11 categories), and 
barriers to (7 categories) cooperation. The importance of motivations for cooperation 
were measured using Likert-type scales from 1=not important to 4=particularly 
important. The significance of barriers to cooperation were measured using Likert-type 
scales ranging from 1=never to 5=always. The study encompases two types of 
dependent variables. First, a binary variable, cooperation, that refers to the general 
involvement of research groups with non-academic organizations and takes the value 1 
if the research group has cooperated and 0 otherwise. We specified cooperation as a 
broad range of interactions including: consultancy work; contract research agreement 
(financed exclusively by the external partner); joint research agreement (shared 
financing or with public support); renting of facilities, materials or equipment; 
exploitation of a patent or utility model or joint patents; training of postgraduates and 
internships at the partners’ sites; temporary exchange of scientific and technical 
personnel; specific training of external workers by the PSROs; participation in a joint 
venture of hybrid research center; creation of a new firm (spin-offs and start-ups); 
informal cooperative relations; knowledge dissemination activities. Second, a nominal 
variable includes information about the external partner involved. This variable includes 
four categories: no cooperation; cooperation only with firms, cooperation only with 
government agencies; and cooperation with both firms and government. Government 
was defined as non-academic public sector organisations such as government ministries, 
departments or other statutory authorities, at all levels of government (European, 
national, regional, local). The major PSROs (CSIC, National Institutes and universities) 
are excluded from this category. Cooperation with external partners thus does not 
include cooperation between research groups in different PSROs in this study. 
Independent variables include motivations for and barriers to cooperation, built with the 
mean value of each factor resulting from the factor analysis (explained below). We also 
incorporate a set of control variables in order to avoid problems related to cross-
                                                            
2 The error for each region was: Andalusia, ±6.1%; Madrid, ±5.2%; Canary Island, ±6.8%; and Basque 
Country, ±6.3%.   
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sectional studies, which comprise some research group characteristics (size, age, type of 
organization)3, regional location and scientific field. 
Among these control variables, the size of the research group is measured as the 
total number of personnel in the group, including tenured researchers, contracted 
researchers, technical staff and PhD students. For this quantitative variable we checked 
normality using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Given a significant result, we explored 
the variable normalization applying a QQ-plot graph and decided to use the log 
transformed variable (ln) in our analysis. The age of the research group is a 
dichotomous variable with the value 0 if the group has existed from 0-10 years  and 1 if 
it has existed for more than ten years. This can be interpreted as a proxy to control for 
emergent or consolidated groups. Type of organization distinguishes between those 
research groups situated within the CSIC (value 0) or in a  university (value 1). Region 
controls for the location of the research group. Scientific field covers four categories: 
Physical Sciences (Biology and Biotechnology, Agrifood, Experimental Sciences); 
Health; Social Sciences and Humanities; and ICT and Environmental Sciences 
(Technology, Natural Resources Energy and Environment, Information and 
Communication Technology).  
Annex I displays the correlation matrix between the independent variables. Low 
values show the acceptability of including these variables in the model. The highest 
correlation appears between two motives: conditions for research and knowledge 
application and engagement (0.56). To test if this result implies a real problem, Annex I 
also reports the tolerance statistics values, indicating whether an independent variable 
has a stronger linear relationship with another independent variable. As shown, all the 
tolerance statistic values are much higher than 0.2, which ensures that no 
multicollinearity problems arise in the regression model. 
3.4 Process details 
The methodology used in this work includes four types of analysis. First, a factor 
analysis based on principal components with Kaiser normalization was performed in 
relation to both motivations and barriers for cooperation. The purpose was not only to 
discover the factors that define researchers’ assessment of cooperative relations, but also 
to identify differences in the patterns of cooperation among different fields. Second, in 
order to analyse factors influencing cooperation with external actors, we carry out two 
types of regressions: logistic and multinomial. The former allows the identification of 
general involvement of research groups with external partners and uses as a dependent 
variable the dummy ‘cooperation’. The latter is necessary because the variable in 
relation to the type of cooperation partner includes mutually-exclusive nominal and 
unordered values (McFadden 1974). In this case no-cooperation is our reference 
category. Third, in order to complement the second phase, we compute the three-way 
interaction between motivations in order to understand if having a wider spectrum of 
motivations influences cooperation with different external agents. We use a step-wise 
strategy which means the introduction of: 1) control variables (baseline model); 2) the 
                                                            
3 Although researchers working at CSIC or universities are part of PSROs, Teirlinck and Spithoven 
(2012) suggest distinguishing between public research institutes and universities due to their 
particularities in terms of research orientation (development and applied research versus basic research), 
research facilities (related to scale and complexity) and the management of research. 
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main effects of the independent variables; and 3) the two-way interactions and 4) the 
three-way interaction terms. To demonstrate the importance of the combination of 
different motivations simultaneously, results would require significant increases in 
variance explained (ΔR2) with the addition of the two-way and three-way interactions 
(Shalley et al. 2009). Finally, a more exhaustive analysis of motivations is conducted in 
order to understand to what extent barriers to cooperate could be attenuated by 
motivational factors. To do this, we analyse the interaction terms between motivations 
and barriers using dummy variables for motivations that take the value 1 if the research 
group gives high importance to a particular motivation (i.e. greater than the average) 
and 0 otherwise (barrier variables maintain the values from previous analysis). 
 
4 Results  
4.1 Research group characteristics 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for research group characteristics. The 
majority of them are part of universities (74%) and are located mainly in Madrid 
(38.9%) and Andalusia (26.7%). More than half of the groups have existed for longer 
than a decade. On average they are composed of 10 people, with the smallest group 
having two people and the largest 68. The distribution of research groups by scientific 
fields is: 34.7% Physical Sciences; 13.2% Health; 31.4% Social Sciences and 
Humanities (SSH); and 20.8% ICT and Environmental Sciences (ICT&E).  
[Insert Table 2 about here]  
4.2 Cooperation by type of partner organization 
Our results suggest that research groups give high importance to external 
cooperation, because 89.5% have participated in some cooperative activity (Figure 1 –
left graph), with 75.7% of the research groups cooperating with government agencies 
and 68% with firms. However, most research groups (55.7%) cooperate with both types 
of external partner, while just 12.3% had linkages only with firms and 20% exclusively 
with government partners. These results indicate a high level of cooperation with 
diverse partner organizations. Once again there is variation by scientific field, with 
research groups in Physical Sciences and ICT&E cooperating more with firms and 
research groups in Health and SSH cooperating more with government agencies (Figure 
1 – right graph). 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
4.3 Motivations and barriers across scientific fields 
Results from a factor analysis show that motivations for cooperation group in 
three factors (total variance explained: 59.5%): advancing research; applying 
knowledge; and accessing financial resources (Table 3, Panel A). Barriers to 
cooperation group in two clusters (total variance explained: 67.2%): risk to scientific 
autonomy; and risk to scientific credibility (Table 3, Panel B). Both factor analyses 
explain around 60% of total variance, which can be considered a satisfactory level in 
social science (Hair et al. 1998). To assess the degree of consistency (reliability) we use 
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Cronbach's alpha, accepting values equal to or above 0.6 as valid. Our results suggest 
that we can gather our items into three motivations and two barriers that impact on the 
cooperation of research groups with external agents.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Using the results of factor analysis, we have created five new variables (three 
motivations and two barriers) as the mean value of the items within each factor (average 
of this new variables included in Table 4, first column). In general, applying knowledge 
appears to be the most important motivation for cooperation and scientific autonomy the 
barrier with the higher impact. Table 4 also shows significant differences in motivations 
and barriers when we take into account the scientific field of the research group. 
Variation by scientific field is evident in relation to the importance of all three 
motivations for cooperation. Physical Sciences research groups are less motivated by 
advancing research than groups in all other fields. SSH and ICT&E groups are more 
strongly motivated by knowledge application than groups in the other two fields, and 
Health groups are more strongly motivated by accessing financial resources than are 
groups in all other fields. In relation to barriers to cooperation, there is significant 
variation between fields regarding the risk to scientific autonomy, with SSH research 
group less concerned about risks to scientific autonomy than groups in all other fields. 
No variation exists regarding the risk to scientific credibility, meaning research group 
leaders give the same relative importance to this barrier independently of the field4.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
4.4 Motivations for and barriers to cooperation 
Table 5 and 6 show the results for the different regression carried out to analyse 
motivations for and barriers to cooperation between research groups and non-academic 
partners. The logistic regression (Model 1) analyses factors related to general 
cooperation patterns. Although each motivation has a positive influence on cooperation, 
none of these results have statistical significance. In the case of barriers, both risk to 
scientific autonomy and scientific credibility have a negative relationship with 
cooperative activities, however only the latter is significant. Among control variables, 
research group size has positive and significant relationships with cooperation, meaning 
that larger groups are more likely to cooperate.  
[Insert Table 5 around here] 
The lack of statistically significant results in Model 1 may be due to differences 
related to the type of external partner. We test the possibility that motivations for and 
barriers to cooperation are influenced by the type of partner organization (Model 2)5. 
Model 2a includes information for the main factors. Overall, our results again suggest a 
                                                            
4 Post-hoc results are not presented in Table 4 for space reasons.  
5 For space reasons results only include information for the model with main effects and the final model 
including three-way interaction term. Proposed models guarantee the importance of the full model 
because the adjusted-R2 increases in each model: baseline model, adj-R2=13%; main effects model, adj-
R2=17.3%; two-way interaction model, adj-R2=18.3%; full model, adj-R2=19.7%. 
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positive effect of motivations on cooperation and a negative effect of barriers, 
independent of the partner organization type. Positive and significant relationships exist 
between being motivated to advance research and cooperating with government partners 
and between being motivated to access financial resources and cooperation with firms. 
However, seeking to apply knowledge is apparently the broadest motivation for 
cooperation, with a positive and significant relationship existing between this 
motivation and both cooperation with firms and cooperation with firms and 
government. With regard to barriers, the results would tend to suggest that, overall, 
research groups consider there is a higher risk to scientific autonomy when cooperating 
with government, and a higher risk to scientific credibility when the cooperation is with 
firms. However, these coefficients are not statistically significant.  
Subsequently, we analyse the effect of having a spectrum of motivations to 
cooperate through the three-way interaction term, with results presented in Model 2b. 
Having multiple motivations only tends to change the propensity to cooperate with 
private sector partners, while results are not significant for cooperation with government 
agencies and both partner types combined. This is not an unexpected result taking into 
account that, as we mentioned in the literature section, the motivations analysed in the 
literature are mainly based on cooperation activities with private sector. This leads us to 
focus on the explanation of the interaction term for the cooperation with firms. As 
interactions between continuous variables are not easily interpreted, we use the 
procedure outlined by Aiken and West (1991) to plot the high and low levels of each 
motivation (one standard deviation above and below the mean). We also fix barriers and 
control variables at mean values. Figure 2 depicts the pattern of moderated results 
related to the interaction between motivations for cooperation activities between 
research groups and private firms. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
Figure 2 shows the variety of results that can be observed through the 
combination of motivations. In general, results show that depending on how a research 
group combines different motivations, this makes a difference to their propensity to 
cooperate with firms. For example, our results suggest that the highest level of 
cooperation with firms is observed when Motivation 3 (accessing finance) is high, but 
the other motivations are low. A similar result can be observed when Motivation 2 
(applying knowledge) is high but the other motivations are low. In both these cases, as 
the motivation to advance research increases (Motivation 1) the level of cooperation 
with firms declines. Both applying knowledge (Motivation 2) and accessing funding 
(Motivation 3) thus appear to be important single motivators for cooperating with firms. 
However, when levels of both Motivation 2 and Motivation 3 are high, then the level of 
cooperation with firms rises as the motivation to advance research increases (Motivation 
1). When levels of both Motivation 2 and Motivation 3 are low, then increasing the 
level of motivation to advance research has no effect on the level of cooperation with 
firms. In the case of cooperating with firms then, being motivated to advance research is 
only beneficial in the presence of both other motivating factors. 
Finally, to understand whether perceptions of risk are attenuated in the presence 
of strong motivations, we modify motivations into dummy variables with the value 1 if 
a research group attaches high importance to a specific barrier (i.e. greater than the 
average) and 0 otherwise. Through the interaction term, we compare the effect of 
barriers taking into account the presence of motivational factors. Models 3, 4 and 5 
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(Table 6) include the interaction terms to test the extent to which strong motivations 
influence barriers to cooperation. 
[Insert Table 6 around here] 
Table 6 specifies 3 models: Model 3 includes the motivation ‘advancing 
research’, Model 4 includes ‘applying knowledge’, and Model 5 includes ‘accessing 
financial resources’ as part of the interaction terms with the two barriers. The results of 
Model 3 suggest that those research groups motivated by advancing their scientific 
research are not likely to be deterred from cooperation by the risk of losing scientific 
autonomy, independent of the type of cooperation partner. However, research groups 
motivated by scientific advance are liable to be deterred by perceived risk to scientific 
credibility when the cooperation partner is a firm. In relation to the motivations to apply 
knowledge and to access financial resources, the interaction effects do not produce any 
significant results. The results for the motivations for, and barriers to, cooperation with 
each of the different types of partner organizations, are similar to those without the 
interaction terms included (Table 5).  
 
5 Discussion and policy implications 
5.1 Discussion 
The behaviour of academic researchers who engage in cooperation with 
industrial partners has already been the subject of quite extensive research (Katz and 
Martin 1997; Bozeman et al. 2013; Perkmann et al. 2013). However, whether scientists 
are driven by distinct sets of motivations when cooperating with different types of 
external partner organisations, or perceive different barriers to such cooperation 
relationships, has not been analysed significantly in the literature to date. Motivations 
and barriers can indeed be multiple, mingled, heterogeneous and conflicting (Bozeman 
et al. 2013) and this paper has taken steps to disentangle and distinguish among them by 
responding to three main research questions about what spurs and restrains PSRO 
researchers to cooperate, the impact of academics’ perceptions on their propensity to 
cooperate with different types of partners, and the effects of interactions between 
different motivations and between motivations and barriers.   
Coexistence of motivations and perceived barriers  
Using a factor analysis technique, we differentiated between three main 
motivations (advancing research, applying knowledge and accessing financial 
resources) and two main barriers (risk to scientific autonomy and risk to scientific 
credibility) affecting external cooperation. First, public sector research groups are 
motivated to cooperate in part by the desire to expand networks and access equipment in 
the interests of advancing their research. This motivation links enhanced professional 
recognition within disciplinary communities to opportunities presented by cooperation. 
Second, research groups are motivated to cooperate in order to address socio-economic 
needs and societal expectations by applying their knowledge. Finally, research groups 
are motivated to cooperate as a mechanism to access personal and group opportunities 
to obtain financial benefits. This is in line with findings of Perkmann et al. (2013) and 
D’Este and Perkmann (2011) that highlight the importance researchers attach to 
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attracting resources and building social capital in support of their own academic 
research work.  
In accordance with some previous studies of scientists’ motivations to engage 
with industry (Lam, 2011), in our study research groups seem to be driven by a mix of 
both extrinsic and intrinsic rewards when participating in knowledge transfer processes 
with non-academic partners. On the one hand, researchers are interested in fostering 
their future research agendas, which can imply a wide range of interactions with 
external organizations for advancing research (similar to ‘ribbon’), as well as seeking 
additional funds (‘gold’), not only to obtain extra income through the commercialisation 
of results, but also to continue pursuing their research activities. On the other hand, the 
intrinsic impulse to apply knowledge and contribute to social, economic or technical 
problems (‘puzzle’) coexists as a more symbolic stimulus. This result is in line with the 
work of Dornbusch and Neuhäusler (2015) who suggest that the primary goal of 
scientists is not to apply knowledge, but to publish and to discuss their ideas within 
academic communities. Whereas, through cross-institutional cooperation, teams can 
increase their potential to contribute to technological progress.   
The perceived risks to scientific autonomy we find are consistent with the 
“scientific norms” group of barriers proposed by Tartari and colleagues (2012). These 
‘orientation barriers’ mainly focus on the restrictions on the disclosures and 
dissemination of research results (the so-called secrecy problem) and the fear to 
potential constraints on research priorities (the skewing problem). In line with this, 
research groups in our study are concerned that external cooperation could lead to 
interference with research programs, conflict of interests, diffusion limitations or 
detriment to long-term research profiles. Additionally, in our findings there is another 
interrelated group of barriers associated with such cooperative exchanges and the 
subsequent risk to scientific credibility (loss of group prestige, damage to individual 
careers or decline in scientific rigor). The existence of these two types of barriers would 
suggest the pre-eminence of traditional norms of scientific independence among PSRO 
research groups. However, previous experience and the development of mutual trust 
may nevertheless also shape views on the (potential) scientific costs of knowledge 
transactions with non-academic partners.  
Regarding field differences, Powell and colleagues (1996) concluded that 
cooperation with industry is higher in life sciences, however our results are more in line 
with the conclusions of D’Este and Perkmann (2011) that there are higher rates of 
cooperation with industry among physical and engineering sciences. We also found that 
health and SSH research groups cooperate more with government agencies, reinforcing 
the argument of Olmos-Peñuela and colleagues (2014) that there are differences 
between STEM fields and SSH fields in cooperation activities, by establishing that such 
differences may also be shaped by the type of partner organization. Perception of risk to 
scientific autonomy and credibility also varies by scientific field. 
Impacts on cooperation with two types of external partners 
An apparent limitation of much of the literature on motivations to cooperate with 
external partners is that the focus is usually on firms alone, and we contribute to this 
literature by taking into consideration the type of partner organizations involved in 
cooperation activities and expanding the scope to include government agencies. 
Importantly, it is not clear whether the studies focussed on collaboration with private 
firms take into account the possibility that academic organizations may also be 
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cooperating with other types of partner organizations. This risks concealing the 
additional impact that (quite possibly complementary) collaboration experiences with 
public sector organizations may have on a research group’s motivations (and 
capabilities) to cooperate with firms. Successful collaborations with government 
agencies may drive increased motivations of research groups to collaborate with firms – 
and vice versa. 
It seems that particular motivations to cooperate are indeed associated with 
different types of partner organizations. Research groups that cooperate only with firms 
are motivated to apply knowledge and to earn financial rewards, whereas research 
groups that cooperate only with government agencies are motivated to advance their 
research. However, the majority of research groups cooperate with both firms and 
government agencies, with the most important motivation among these groups being the 
application of knowledge. The demand for knowledge, applications or consulting or 
other services, will be shaped by the objectives, strategies and functions associated with 
different types of organizations (Chompalov et al. 2002). It therefore seems logical that 
research groups may be motivated by particular factors in meeting these different forms 
of demand for cooperation. With regard to barriers, our results also showed that there 
are perceived barriers that can impact on the willingness of research groups to cooperate 
with non-academic partners. Research groups apparently consider there is a higher risk 
to scientific autonomy when cooperating with government, and a higher risk to 
scientific credibility when cooperating with firms. However, these associations are not 
statistically significant in our model and thus these findings cannot be considered 
conclusive. 
Interactions between multiple motivations and between motivations and barriers 
There is also an observable interaction between different types of motivations in 
our results, which is also dependent on the type of partner organization. Being driven to 
cooperate by multiple motivational factors can increase the level of cooperation, but 
only among those research groups cooperating with firms alone. Being highly motivated 
by the desire to advance research does not have any beneficial effect on the level of 
cooperation with firms amongst these research groups, unless the group is also highly 
motivated to apply knowledge and access financial resources. Research groups 
operating only in the industry cooperation space seem to require compound scientific 
and non-scientific motivations. It is important not to overstate the importance of this 
result, given the complicated nature of interpreting interaction effects. Nevertheless, it 
can be pointed out that a significant limitation of the existing literature may well lie in 
overlooking the interrelated nature of motivations associated with the performance of 
private sector cooperation. More research is needed in this respect, however our results 
suggest that what motivates cooperation between academic groups and industry may be 
more complex than is currently described in the literature. 
One interpretation of this result could be that different motivations are more 
strongly associated with different types of demand for knowledge (Sarewitz and Pielke 
2007). In terms of research activities then, the extent to which different motivations and 
different types of partners are closely integrated or loosely connected requires further 
research. This could be important to know, as knowledge spillovers between activities 
grounded in different motivations could be a compounding factor in estimating the 
benefits derived from cooperating with external partner organizations. The relationship 
between the characteristics of partner organizations – their goals and objectives, R&D 
 17 
 
profiles and innovation strategies, for example – and the dynamics of research groups’ 
motivations to cooperate thus seems an interesting avenue for further enquiry. 
The finding that interactions between motivations are apparently dependent on 
the type of partner organization remained is consistent with our regression model, which 
showed that different motivational factors are associated with research groups that are 
cooperating with each of the different partner organization sub-groups. This suggests 
that the partner organizations, and their particular goals and objectives, also shape the 
interaction of motivations within a research group. Motivations to cooperate thus appear 
to be sensitive to societal demand – but these external demands do not have a 
homogenous effect on the spectrum of motivations that may drive research groups.  
Methodological considerations may also be important here. The fact that such 
interaction effects only appear important in relation to a sub-set of research groups that 
cooperate only with firms (14% of all research groups that do cooperate) may be due to 
the fact that the motivational items used in this study were derived from previous 
studies that largely investigated university-industry cooperation. Whilst in this study the 
type of cooperating partner was expanded to include government agencies, we were not 
able to also include specific motivation items that had been shown to be associated with 
cooperating with government. It may be that the motivations included are too narrow to 
fully account for research groups’ interests in cooperating with government agencies, 
limiting the effectiveness of our analysis of interactions between motivating factors to 
just those research groups that cooperate only with firms. Consideration therefore needs 
to be given to further research that develops and pre-tests motivation items that are 
associated with cooperating specifically with government agencies or other types of 
partner organizations, to create a more solid methodological base for studies of 
motivations and barriers to cooperate with different types of partners. 
Finally, the effect of perceived barriers on cooperation behaviour may also be 
related to the strength of concurrent motivations. We found that being highly motivated 
to advance research can reduce the effect of perceived risk to scientific autonomy, 
independent of the type of partner organization. This result supports the general 
argument of Tartari and Breschi (2012) that strong motivations can reduce the perceived 
importance of certain barriers to cooperation. However, being highly motivated to 
advance research does not reduce the perceived risk to scientific credibility for those 
research groups cooperating only with firms. Neither does being motivated to apply 
knowledge nor to access financial resources have any apparent effect on perceived 
barriers to cooperation in our results.   
Interestingly, being motivated to advance research reduced the effect of barriers, 
independent of the type of partner organization. This suggest that if the research 
objectives of an external cooperation opportunity are relatively contiguous with a 
group’s research objectives as a whole then motivations may overcome perceived 
barriers, increasing the likelihood of cooperation. This suggests a possible avenue for 
future research, to investigate whether relatively close ‘cognitive proximity’ (Boschma 
2005) between PSRO research groups and external partners increases the likelihood that 





5.2. Policy implications 
The finding that research groups’ motivations are shaped by the type of 
cooperation partner and that research groups have different cooperation profiles 
suggests cooperation policies should not take a one-size-fits-all approach. A majority of 
research groups (56%) cooperate with both industry and government partners, only 38% 
of these groups are less than ten years old, and are on average larger (11.5 FTE) than 
those that cooperate only with firms (9.0 FTE) or only with government (8.8 FTE). 
These relatively mature and durable research groups can be considered important ‘triple 
helix’ actors within the national system of innovation, with the potential to enhance 
knowledge-based interactions of both scientific and societal importance. Such research 
groups are strongly motivated to advance their research and to apply their knowledge – 
they are not limited by perceptions of risk to their scientific autonomy. Policy incentives 
for these broadly cooperating groups may thus be most effective where they support the 
application of groups’ knowledge to address societal goals through multi-partner 
cooperation. It would thus seem important that policy makers develop a clear 
understanding of the typical path to maturity of these cooperative research groups. 
Among research groups that cooperate only with firms, a majority (62%) are 
more than ten years old. There are also consistent significant relationships between the 
control variable for age and cooperating only with firms in our regression models. In 
contrast, just 32 percent of research groups that cooperate only with government are 
more than ten years old. It may be that what is being reflected here is an outline of the 
evolution of research groups’ external cooperation activity over time. As a research 
group matures and gains additional human resource capacity then cooperating with a 
broader range of external partners becomes more likely. From a policy perspective, 
measures that support the sustainability and expansion of research groups may pay 
dividends in terms of increasing the diversity of cooperation partners. In particular, 
cooperating research groups may need to mature and consolidate their experience for 
longer periods in order to develop the capabilities required to satisfy demands for 
knowledge from industry partners. Measures that consolidate research groups that are 
already cooperating externally can thus represent an indirect course of action that can 
further boost the number of cross-sector cooperation linkages between PSROs and 
firms. 
The evidence of the effect of barriers suggests policies to promote cooperation 
between PSROs and other innovation system actors need to operate in a double 
direction: promoting knowledge application incentives (solutions to social problems, 
validity of research, responses to external needs); and neutralizing barriers represented 
by the potential for negative impact on autonomy and/or credibility (prestige, career, 
rigor). It is apparent that strong motivations to advance research can reduce the impact 
of perceived risks to scientific autonomy and this should be taken into account in 
designing policies that can be effective regardless of the type of cooperation partner. 
It is clear that government administrations and agencies are very important 
counterparts to research groups in Spain, particularly SSH groups. More research is 
required to better understand to what extent existing cooperation with government 
agents is rooted in historical arrangements and patterns of interactions on one hand and 
responding to more recent innovation system policies and programs on the other. 
However, our results reinforce the importance of government as an innovation system 
actor and partner. This paper provides new insights into the motivations and barriers 
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shaping cooperation between PSROs and industry and government partners. However, 
it is not able to say anything about the quality of these linkages. The evaluation of both 
interaction processes and associated outputs are also required to improve the quality of 
information that can underpin future strategies and policies. 
To conclude, in this paper we sought to contribute to the existent understanding 
of the motivations and perceived barriers affecting researchers’ cooperation with non-
academic external partners. Overall, the motivations of research groups to engage with 
both private and public sector non-academic organizations can be linked to multiple 
scientific requirements and to broader societal goals. These results point toward the 
willingness of academics to participate in a broad spectrum of knowledge transfer 
activities that ultimately can help them to keep and fulfil future research goals. In our 
analysis barriers to interact with both types of partners are, however, still perceived as 
entailing potential scientific risks. The results of our tests of interactions between 
motivations, and between motivations and barriers, suggest the importance of 
considering interaction effects. Certain motivations can counterbalance the subjective 
importance attributed to some barriers to cooperation. The type of non-academic partner 
organization can also shape PSRO researchers’ cooperative behaviour when multiple 
motivational factors coexist. 
There are limitations to the results of this study. First, although it covered four 
Spanish regions in a systematic and thorough way, the results may be altered if other 
regions were also included. Second, the study took a very open view of cooperation 
between PSROs and external partners. This choice was deliberate in that it was the 
existence of interactions and the motivations that drive them that was the focus of the 
study. However, if a higher threshold for cooperation had been used it may be that 
results may also have differed to some extent. Third, the motivations and barriers 
associated with activities of research groups were derived from surveys of research 
group leaders. Whilst group leaders are well-placed to report on the overall activities of 
groups, their interpretations of groups’ motivations and barriers can conceivably mask 
some internal differences within groups. Fourth, research collaborations evolve over 
time (Thune and Gulbrandsen 2014), requiring a longitudinal perspective to appreciate 
longer-term influences on partnership dynamics. Finally, this research was conducted in 
the context of severe cuts and restrictions on public support for research due to rolling 
financial crises in Spain and abroad. A disproportionate impact of the financial crisis 
can be expected to fall on research groups that are less financially independent from 
recurrent Government investment. Under such conditions the need to obtain more 
funding from project or contract sources (and to bootleg this for ongoing basic research 
programs) may distort motivations to cooperate in the short-term and may thus have had 
an impact on our findings.  
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Annex I. Correlation matrix 
 
   2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  Tolerance
1. Advancing research  0.557**  0.271**  ‐0.164** ‐0.191** 0.061  ‐0.106** 0.071*  0.011  ‐0.016  0.622 
2. Applying knowledge  1  0.213**  ‐0.147** ‐0.149** 0.098**  ‐0.064  0.123**  0.014  ‐0.011  0.639 
3. Accessing financial resources    1  ‐0.035  ‐0.100** 0.015  0.048  ‐0.003  ‐0.056  0.011  0.879 
4. Risk to scientific autonomy        1  0.655**  ‐0.099** ‐0.039  ‐0.035  ‐0.022  ‐0.026  0.541 
5. Risk to scientific credibility           1  ‐0.041  ‐0.061  0.06  ‐0.007  ‐0.04  0.544 
6. Size (ln)              1  0.167**  0.137**  ‐0.025  0.078*  0.911 
7. Age                  1  ‐0.144** ‐0.088**  0.102**  0.911 
8. Scientific field                    1  0.092**  ‐0.046  0.892 
9. Region                       1  ‐0.033  0.978 











Total universities Public universities 
R&D expenditure 5.67% 28.2% 25.8% 
R&D staff (FTE*) 6.53% 37.6% 34.3% 
Researchers (FTE*) 4.13% 47.8% 43.2% 
Source: a CSIC. Annual Report (2011). b INE. R&D Survey (2011) 





Table 2. Description of research group characteristics 
  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max N 
Size 10.24 6.74 2 68 
851 
 
Age  More than 10 years 56.2% 
Organization Universities 74% Other (mainly CSIC) 26% 
Region 
Andalusia 26.7% 
Basque Country  15.5% 
Canary Islands 18.9% 
Madrid 38.9% 
Scientific fields 
Physical Sciences 34.7% 
Health 13.2% 
Social Sciences & 
Humanities 31.4% 
ICT & Environmental 20.8% 
Partner organization 
type 
No cooperation 12% 
Cooperation ONLY with 
firms 12.3% 
Cooperation ONLY with 
government 20% 
Cooperation with BOTH 





Table 3. Factor analysis for cooperation factors (varimax rotated matrix)  
Panel A. Motivations 








To be up to date on research carried out 
by other entities. 0.769 0.254 0.021 
α=0.8 
To join a professional network or to 
increase professional relationships. 0.714 0.218 0.094 
To get external views on scientific 
research. 0.632 -0.18 0.448 
To access equipment or infrastructure 
necessary for the research group. 0.629 0.453 0.012 
To access the expertise of non-academic 
professionals. 0.594 0.302 0.156 
To contribute to solving social, economic 
or technical problems. 0.129 0.76 0.086 
α=0.7 To check the validity and/or practical application of research. 0.398 0.696 0.031 
To keep researchers informed of the 
needs of other agents. 0.44 0.629 0.003 
To get income as salary supplements in 
the research group 0.045 0.066 0.771 
α=0.6 To get funding for scientific research 0.246 -0.056 0.667 
To try and commercialize scientific 
results -0.093 0.492 0.65 
Panel B. Barriers 
 Risk to scientific autonomy 




Interference with research programs. 0.856 0.149 
α=0.8 
Conflict of interest with the receiver of 
the results. 0.758 0.318 
Restrictions on the dissemination of 
research results. 0.665 0.497 
Detrimental to long-term research lines. 0.658 0.239 
Research group’s loss of prestige. 0.188 0.887 
α=0.8 Damage to the scientific career of researchers. 0.274 0.81 
Decline in scientific rigor. 0.448 0.587 
Table 4. Importance of motivations and barriers by scientific field 













 Advancing research 3.01 2.92 3.09 3.04 3.04 0.026** 
Applying knowledge 3.14 3.03 3.08 3.22 3.24 0.000*** 
Accessing financial 





 Risk to scientific 
autonomy. 2.79 2.86 2.82 2.68 2.83 0.939* 
Risk to scientific 
credibility. 2.29 2.25 2.21 2.37 2.31 0.575 
*p-value<0.1;**p-value<0.05; ***p-value<0.01. a Test ANOVA for mean differences.  
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Table 5. Motivations and barriers to cooperate with non-academic agents 
  




ONLY with firms 
Cooperation 
ONLY with Gov. 
Cooperation with 

































































































































































Region [Ref: Basque Country] Included Included Included 
Field [Ref: ICT&E] Included Included Included 













N 672 672 672 
Log-likelihood -161.577*** -669.98*** -660.145*** 
Pseudo R2 (Cragg & Uhler's) 13.2% 17.3% 19.7% 




Table 6. Motives and barriers to cooperate with non-academic agents. Interaction effectsa 
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  Region  [Ref: Basque Country] Included Included Included 
  Field [Ref: ICT&E] Included Included Included 

















N 672 672 672 
Log-likelihood -659.847*** -670.229*** -668.106*** 
Pseudo R2 (Cragg & Uhler's) 19.8% 17.3% 17.8% 
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